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Burch v. Corcoran
273 F.3d 577 (4th Cir. 2001)
L Facts
On March 19, 1995, Heath William Burch ("Burch") broke into the home
of Robert and (leo Davis in order to steal items he could sell for drug money.
When the Davises attempted to thwart Burch's effort, Burch attacked the elderly
couple, apparentlyusing a pair of scissors. When a friend discovered the couple
the following day, Mr. Davis had succumbed to thirty-three wounds, eleven of
which could be attributed to the scissors. Mrs. Davis was still alive and trans-
ported to a hospital where she died eight days later due to complications from
blunt force trauma.'
On April 21, 1995, a grand jury in Prince George's County, Maryland,
indicted Burch for first degree murder in the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Davis. In
addition to Burch's confession, police found blood on Burch's clothing which
matched blood found in the Davis home and a boot in Burch's home matching
a footprint found at the Davis home. Moreover, Burch's brother testified to the
grand jury that Burch came to his home and admitted to the killings. Two and
a half months after obtaining the indictment, the State notified Burch of its intent
to seek the death penalty2
Following a ten-day jury trial in March of 1996, Burch was convicted of
both counts of first degree murder, as well as burglary and robbery charges in
connection with the killings. The court then conducted four days of sentencing
proceedings and instructed the jury on sentencing. The court also gave the jury
a verdict form to assist in its deliberations; however, the verdict form referred to
the circumstances of the crime in the singular, rather than the plural.3 Burch's
attorney did not object, however, to the verdict form; on March 29, 1995, the
jury recommended a death sentence. Since the verdict form did not specify
whether the juryintended to recommend a death sentence for each count of first
degree murder, Burch's attorney argued that the court could impose only one
1. Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 580 (4th CGr. 2001).
2. Idat581.
3. Id The court noted that "[t]he Verdict Form generally referred to issues in the singular
sense: inter alia, 'the murder,' 'the victim,' and 'the sentence.'" Id For instance, one of the
statutory magators included on the Verdict Form asked the jury "whether '[t]lhe mtr r was
committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct
or conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of
mental incapacity, mental disorder or emotional disturbance." Id (emphasis in originaD.
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death sentence. The trial court dismissed this argument and imposed two death
sentences on Burch.4
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed each conviction, but vacated
one of Burch's death sentences because of the singular construction of the
verdict form. Burch then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court, which was denied on December 1, 1997. Thereafter,
Burch sought state court habeas relief, which was unsuccessful and terminated
with a denial of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court on April 19,
1999. Burch then sought, and was granted, a certificate of appealability in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryand. iFis subsequent
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied.'
I. Hddig
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit held that Burch's
claims were meritless and unanimously affirmed Burch's death sentence.6
II. A rml~s /Appiatin in Vinia
A. 7z Apprendi Clai
Burch first challenged the constitutionality of Maryand's death penalty
statute under the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Appvii
v NewJesey.! In Appim, the Court held that any fact, other than a prior convic-
tion, which increases the available penalty beyond that permitted bystatute must
be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' Burch con-
tended that because the Maryland death penalty required the jury in sentencing
to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether aggravating factors
outweighed mitigating factors, the sentencing statute violated the Appnmi
mandate.
1. Apprendi May Nt Be AppliaRemu y
The Fourth Circuit noted that Butch initially raised this claim in seelking
federal habeas review and that his judgment of conviction was final more than
two years prior to the Supreme Court's ruling inApprni, therebyimplicating the
Tatgw v Lan? rule of retroactive application of constitutional rules of procedure
on collateral review." Tege prohibits the retroactive application of new consti-
4. Id
5. Id at 582.
6. Id at 580.
7. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US. 466 (2000).
8. Id at 476.
9. BuvA 273 F.3d at 583-84.
10. 489 US. 288 (1989).
11. Buv, 273 F.3d at 584; see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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tutional rules unless they fit within one of two exceptions: either the new rule
precludes punishment for the conduct in question, or the rule so alters the
common concept of fair process that it could be called a "watershed rule of
criminal procedure.""2 The court then explained that the Fourth Crcuit had
determined in Unitai St5 v Sarmtes" that AppMori did not meet with either of
the Tasge factors and, therefore, could not be applied retroactively to Burch's
case. 
14
2. 7zApp timof Apprendi to Coit dCms
Although the court passed on the merits of Burch's Appmi claim, it did
note in footnote six of its opinion that the claim would likely fail because the
Appwrei court had explained that its ruling would not render state capital sen-
tencing schemes unconstitutional." Writing for the majorityin Appvm*, Justice
Stevens relied on Watknz' A rizoi 6 in predicting that Appmivi would not disturb
state capital punishment statutes."
Wacn however, is not controlling. In Waawon the defendant was convicted
of capital murder for kidnapping his victim from a bar, taking him into the
desert, robbing and shooting himn. Walton was sentenced to death by a jue
after the judge weighed evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors. 9
Walton's constitutional challenge to the Arizona sentencing scheme was that the
finding of aggravating and mitigating factors must be left to the jury.20 The
Walton court rejected this argument, holding that the determination of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors is not the equivalent of conviction or acquittal, and
that, therefore, a judge is competent to make such a determination.2 '
The Watm court, however, did not consider the reasonable doubt question.
Justice Stevens relied on Watm simplyto establish that the Appmfiv requirement
that penalty-enhancing elements be submitted to a jurydoes not applyin capital
cases.' This limitation on the holding does not address the question raised by
12. Bum!,, 273 F.3d at 584; Taeiq 489 US. at 311.
13. 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cr. 2001).
14. Bunh, 273 F.3d at 584; seeUnited States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139,148-49 (4th ar. 2001)
(explaining that "these rules, however, are not the types of watershed rules implicating fundamental
fairness that require retroactive application on collateral attack).
15. Bmunh, 273 F.3d at 584 n.6; se also Appnr 530 US. at 4%.
16. 497 US. 639 (1990).
17. AppmAi, 530 U.S. at 496; se Walton v. Arizona, 497 US. 639, 649 (1989) (holding that
states are not required to denominate aggravating circumstances [as] elements of the offense"
which must be determined by a jur)). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to reconsider
Watm in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. C. 865 (2002).
18. Wdra/, 497 US. at 644.
19. Id at 645.
20. kI at 647.
21. Idat648.
22. Appnmi 530 US. at 496.
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Burch-whetherAppnxl permits the juryto determine the existence of aggravat-
ing or mitigating factors bya nramxe q'the .ikw.
B. Ir4&oiwrAssiStanm fGcxae
Burch further contended in his habeas petition that his attorney had pro-
vided ineffective assistance by failing to seek two verdict forms at sentencing and
by failing to present evidence of mitigating factors.23 The court reviewed these
claims under the familiar test for ineffective assistance of counsel established by
Sti&kad v Wasbi 24 The court further explained that its review was con-
trolled by Wiian vTalor,25 which explains that in order for a defendant "to
obtain federal habeas relief, he must first demonstrate that his case satisfies the
condition set by[28 U.S.C] S 2254(d)(1)."
26
The court gave short shrift to Burch's claim that his attorney's failure to
request two verdict forms constituted ineffective assistance. Without determin-
ing whether the attorney's conduct was unreasonable, the court concluded that
counsel's failure to request two verdict forms caused Burch no prejudice.
In considering Burch's claimthat his attorney's failure to introduce evidence
of mitigating factors constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the court
determined that the state court's findings met the requirements of Wzdthia and
28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (1) and rejected the claim.2 The state court determined that:
(1) counsel did provide mitigating evidence as to Burch's drug use and family
background; and (2) counsel's decision to limit presentation of mitigating factors
was a reasonable strategic decision and did not constitute deficient perfor-
mance. 29 On their facts, Burch's claims are similar to those raised by the peti-
tioner in Wi/fianm, but a comparison of the cases illustrates some important
points on which the two cases maybe distinguished. In Wil/iam, while the trial
counsel did introduce some limited character evidence, he neglected to introduce
considerable mitigating evidence and offered a dosing statement in which he
characterized his client as an individual who did not show mercy." Ultimately,
the Fourth Curcuit agreed with the Supreme Court of Virginia that, despite
23. Bwmt, 273 F3d at 587.
24. Id at 588; see aso Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 687 (1984) (explaining that a
defendant must establish that counsel's performance fell below the reasonable level of competence
and that counsel's lacking performance caused defendant prejudice).
25. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
26. Broh, 273 F3d at 588 (quo Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362,403 (2000)); seeahso 28
US.C S2254(d)(1) (Supp. V1999)(o l in hegrofha wifheascopwhen ei
tioner's claims have been adjudicated on the merits in a state court unless the prior adjudication
"resuked in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States").
27. Bwoub 273 F3d at 588.
28. Id at 590.
29. Id at 589.
30. WIed/n, 529 U.S. at 369, 369 n.2.
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counsel's ineffective performance, Williams failed to show sufficient prejudice to
grant a new trial.3
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Grcuit in Wdian,
holding that the state court decision was unreasonable because it relied on
inapposite precedent when a straightforward application of Stridlard was the
proper analysis. 2 In BuonS, however, the state court's analysis was consistent with
the StridLmd analysis in that the court is required to show deference to strategic
decisions falling in the realm of reasonable and professional conduct."' Wdliam
is distinguishable because in that case counsel's conduct could not reasonablybe
described as strategic. 4 On the other hand, the decision of Burch's attorney to
focus the presentation of mitigation evidence fairly may be called strategic.
C JurrMisc utiua
Burch further requested habeas relief because a juror read from a Bible at
length during sentencing deliberations." Without permitting Burch to call jurors
to testify, the state court determined that the jury had reached its verdict before
the juror read from his Bible and that the Bible reading had no impact on the
outcome of sentencing.36 On federal habeas review, the district court determined
that Burch had not received a full and fair adjudication of the issue in state
habeas and ordered an evidentiary hearing.3" The evidentiary hearing revealed
that the juror carried the King James Bible with him during deliberations and
quoted biblical passages both from memory and by reading. After the hearing,
the district court held that, although reading from the Bible could be considered
an improper communication, there was no showing that the reading had an
impact on the verdict. 9 The court found that the juror did not use the Bible as
a source of law and that the juror never suggested, on the basis of his readings,
that other jurors should disregard the instructions of the trial court.'
31. Id at 374. For a complete discussion of the procedural history of the WifUians case, sw
JeremyWhite, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF.J. 123, 124-26 (2000) (analyzing Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.
CL 1495 (2000)).
32. W'dian, 529 U.S. at 393.
33. Bmthb, 273 F.3d at 589.
34. W'ln, 529 U.S. at 397-98 (noting that the Supreme Court of Virginia "was unreason-
able insofar as it failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence... in reweighing
it against the evidence in aggravation").
35. Bunh, 273 F.3d at 590.
36. Id at 590-91.
37. Id
38. Id at 590.
39. Id
40. Id at 590-91.
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the findings of the district court, applying its
principle from Stxkten v Vina,4  that the presumption of prejudice attaching
to an improper juror communication ought not be "casually invoked. 42 In
Stodtao, during a break in the sentencing proceedings, the jury ate lunch at a
diner near the courthouse.43 While they were eating, the owner of the diner
approached the jurors and advised them that they "ought to fry the son of a
bitch."44 The jurylater returned a death sentence.4" The trial court heard some
evidence of the communication, but nevertheless entered judgment and imposed
the death sentence.46 Although the Fourth Circuit cautiously applied the pre-
sumption of prejudice, the court ultimately reasoned that it was highly unlikely
that such an inflammatory comment would have no effect on the jurors.4" The
court noted that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to protect the jurors
from such remarks in a public environment charged with emotion concerning the
case.4" Burdh is easily distinguished from Stodeten because the improper commu-
nications came from within the jury room and appeared to have a negligible
effect upon the verdict."
D. qfAppabdity
In footnote four, the court noted that the certificate of appealability issued
by the district court was defective because it failed to meet the strictures of 28
U.S.C S 2253(c)."0 Defense counsel has a responsibility to make sure that the
district judge issues a certificate of appealabilitythat satisfies the requirements of
S 2253(c). The court further noted that "[t]he Warden has not, however, chal-
lenged Burch's certificate of appealability."1 This comment is an invitation to
the government to challenge defective certificates. 2 If the court is willing to
dismiss these cases because of defective certificates without reaching the merits,
41. 852 F.2d 740 (4th Car. 1988).
42. Bunk, 273 F.3d at 591 (quoting Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 745 (4th CAr. 1988)).




47. Id at 746.
48. Id
49. Se Bun , 273 F.3d at 591 (agreeing with the trial court's finding of fact that "there was
no reasonable possibilitythat the juryverdict was influenced byan improper communication in the
form of a quotation from the Bible'").
50. Bwth, 273 F.3d at 582 n.4. Tile 28 U.S.C § 2253(c) provides that the certificate of
appealability must "indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy' the petitioner's burden of
demonstrating the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C § 2253(c)(3) (Supp. V 1999).




then it is absolutely crucial that counsel make certain that the district judge
understand the S 2253(c) requirements and draft a compliant certificate. The fact
that the court reached the merits indicates that this claim will be procedurally
defaulted by the state if it neglects to raise it. 3
Damien P. DeLaney
53. Se Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166 (1996) (noting that if the basis of a habeas
claim that was raised in a prior federal proceeding goes unchallenged for procedural default, the
government loses the right to raise procedural default in a subsequent proceeding).
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